The political “machine” is one of the most mythological forces in elective campaigns. They were influential for generations in cities whose mayors and leaders handed out jobs and contracts through patronage that enforced partisan outcomes…But those big-city machines lost much of their mojo in the last decade as politics flattened and a band of new progressives used the Internet and social media to fundraise and organize, toppling the old guard.
Reading that I was struck by how it connected to a post I wrote a few years ago (reposted on this blog). The post was about the idea of unscaling — “dismantling all large-scale, vertically integrated, mass-market institutions” — and how it could be applied to politics.
In this I pointed out that:
Applying the idea of unscaling in this context, media disintermediation does not just apply to the relationship between politicians and the mainstream media. It also applies to the relationship between politicians and their parties. Both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders have not only had to fight issues with media coverage, they have also had to battle against their party’s establishment. Their success is an example of successful unscaling…This means that the disruption to the political mainstream may not follow the antecedent of new parties but as insurgent candidates taking over established ones.
Bowman’s primary contest for NY-16 provides another opportunity to test the disruption model.
There have been two recent events that have brought this race into prominence, with Bowman securing AOC’s endorsement and his opponent having a disastrous hot mic moment. Bowman has also benefited from a progressive opponent dropping out to endorse him.
In terms of polling and endorsements, Elliot holds a lead though the former was tighter than expected based on November’s data. Especially significant was the number of undecideds.
Based on meeting the criteria in my model, I think Bowman will win.
Despite criticism for being soft, it was clear that Keir Starmer had a methodical communications plan for engaging with the Tory government’s failures in tackling COVID-19. I outlined his approach in a series of tweets and this was proved correct.
It’s been possible to see Starmer’s structured approach unfurl in real time. He initially appeared to have two primary aims:
Establish his own personal style
Have the media frame him as a constructive actor.
This was all the more important given the unrelenting hostility towards the previous Labour leadership from the press.
There was then gradually more confrontational messaging while operating in the “constructive critcism” paradigm.
This was followed by more overt questioning of the Government’s action. Though, as I pointed out with some amusement, Starmer’s comms appeared almost too structured.
Currently, there is a two-fold approach, with Starmer positioning himself as speaking on behalf of the public, while a member of the shadow cabinet uses more confrontational language.
Before (perhaps instead) of completing what was supposed to be a two-post commentary on the result of the general election in the UK, I felt it important to elaborate on something I mentioned in the first post.
Having finally got around to reading Stuart Hall’s “The Great Moving Right Show”, I was struck by how well it integrated into my point about the need to understand the primary contradiction(s) at play during the election.
its popular success in neutralizing the contradiction between people and the state/power bloc and winning popular interpellations so decisively for the Right. In short, the nature of its populism. But now it must be added that this is no rhetorical device or trick, for this populism is operating on genuine contradictions, and it has a rational and material core. Its success and effectivity does not lie in its capacity to dupe unsuspecting folk but in the way it addresses real problems, real and lived experiences, real contradictions—and yet is able to represent them within a logic of discourse which pulls them systematically into line with policies and class strategies of the Right.
The reframing also involved deflecting attention away from critical questioning of the causes of the 2008 economic crash and the subsequent self-defeating policy of austerity and towards popular hostility to the EU; its association with mass immigration as an immediate explanation for the deterioration of everyday life, particularly in small towns and the North. In doing so, the Right has remade political identities that articulates ‘gaining control’ as a popular struggle against remote elites.
The Labour decision to back a second referendum was a mistake from a campaigning perspective.
As a campaign, it signalled the following to Leave voters.
Labour could not be trusted and was a party of politics as usual.
It reinforced the personal smearing on Corbyn as someone who could not be trusted.
This article does a great job of placing both Corbynism and Brexit as products of the same dialectic.
Labour’s Brexit position, which appears in hindsight to have been the worst of both worlds. By remaining essentially neutral on Brexit over the past three years, Labour allowed Lib Dems and Blairites and other technocrats from the previous era to shape what Remain meant, presenting it as the status-quo option, opposed to the change people are desperate for.
There is a point that I think is worth emphasising here: Brexit while on the surface is a reactionary movement is, in fact, quite the opposite. It is a revolutionary movement that seeks to reject the prevailing neoliberal order by going back to the future.
Labour’s proposals could be summarised as a core argument: we will use politics to make your life better. But if people don’t believe in the political system, they won’t trust you. Corbyn should have raged against elite rule, and promised a new democracy, by the people, for the people. He should have tapped into the anti-systemic energy. It should have been ‘by the many’. He could have won.
I don’t want to oversimplify things here: it could well have been that the gap between the old Labour working-class vote and the new Labour voter (particularly over the issue of Brexit) was insurmountable.
While offering a different framing about how Labour should have approached the Brexit issue (and coming to a different conclusion), this blog post offers some valuable insights into the longer-term composition of the electorate, which compliments the previous post.
Corbynism is the first mass expression in English and Welsh politics of a new working class. Its features are the immaterial character of its labour, that is it produces knowledge, services, care, relationships, and subjectivities/identities, and it depends on our social capacities and competencies as social beings – skills that can only be parasited off but not directly possessed by capital…
They will have to face the fact that the electorate did not abandon Labour for the centre. They went either to the far right, in England and Wales, or to the social democratic nationalist alternative, in Scotland. They did not go to the Liberal Democrats or back Change UK. Chuka Umunna, Dominic Grieve, David Gauke, Anna Soubry, Jo Swinson and Luciana Berger all lost.
NB: This post was first published on another blog and imported into this one. Please forgive any formatting issues.
A video from a 2014 marketing summit and a Sri Lankan political opinion piece from the start of this week provided some thought-provoking insight into a form of reductionism and generalisation. This kind of thinking is not just misleading, for campaigns it is a dangerous trap that can undermine communications and marketing.
As Adam Conover points out, the term “Millennial” is about the need to flatten and simplify demographics. In fact, this has a long history stretching back to the ancient world. The whole video is worth watching, despite the comments regarding social media seeming a little dated in 2018.
a small band of dreamers, united in the idea of democracy and freedom, prevailed over a juggernaut that was propelling Sri Lanka towards full-fledged autocracy.
Reimagining the diverse coalition that constituted the Yahaplanaya campaign as a “liberal project” is absurd. The political grouping that toppled the Rajapaksas primarily constituted of the oldest party in Sri Lanka (a Western-orientated capitalist one), had elements of support from the next oldest party (one with a socialist and nationalist base) and a number of other constituent parties including ethno-nationalists and had the tacit support of Marxists. The idea that majority of those who voted for this diverse coalition were western-style liberals seems a vast stretch.
Why then would the political editor of a major Sri Lankan newspaper make such an obvious misclassification? Why the reductionism and generalisation? As with the term millennial, it is a convenient tool that fits the prejudices and worldview of the person using it. Projection like this is a danger that any savvy campaigner must avoid!
NB: This post was first published on another blog and imported into this one. Please forgive any formatting issues.
The idiosyncratic (and always thought-provoking) musings of Zizek aside, ideology has a hugely important but often misunderstood role in the current era of campaigns. It is also one of the four primary criteria in the disruption model of politics.
It is crucial to draw a distinction between ideology and policies in this context. Quoting from a previous post:
ideology refers to a broad set of principles and policy refers to the specific rules and activities that achieve these. Tougher immigration is an ideology and building a border wall is a policy…
And from the same post:
When cynicism about politicians is at record highs, a strong ideology has more weight than policy nuance. Expressing ideologically strong positions can convince voters that you will act on issues out of conviction; particularly to those who have seen successive generations of politicians promise to enact specific policies to fix their issues, only to let them down.
More than perhaps any waged before, the Clinton campaign invested an inexhaustible faith (not to mention considerable financial resources) in the wisdom and effectiveness of experts, its upper echelons dominated by a generation of Democratic insiders steeped in Third Way thinking and analysis.
In word and affect, it spoke the language of white-collar professionals in New Democratic coastal heartlands and showed open disdain for some of the party’s traditional, less affluent constituencies and their aspirations. It eschewed the rhetoric of populist contestation in favor of bipartisan détente with factions in the Republican old guard and gleefully chased the votes of suburban conservatives. It publicly courted both Wall Street and Silicon Valley and proudly touted the support of their leading viceroys. It emphasized personality and qualification, judgment and temperament, over ideology.
Ideology > Policy
For campaigns (and especially disruptive ones), creating and propagating a strong ideology is vital. As “Democracy for Realists” pointed out,
Instead of folk democracy’s rational voter, most voters base their political decisions on who they are rather than what they think. Political behaviour reflects our membership of a particular group, an expression of our social identity. Voters choose parties which represent their culture and community, and stay with their political tribe long after they have ceased to serve their interests.
With this in mind, these are the crucial factors for campaigns to
understand in order to be seen as part of the zeitgeist and attract
People vote for what policies say about the party and the values they convey.
This can be best communicated through a strong ideology, that focuses on shared values and beliefs, not policy specifics.
With one exception, applying the model to the campaign shows that it meets the criteria needed for success.
While he has tremendous name recognition and a reputation for efficiency, due to his association with extreme Sinhala nationalism and his role as Defence Secretary personal branding is an issue for GR. I suspect this may not be a disincentive to the majority of undecided and floating voters in the south of Sri Lanka. However, ethnic minorities (primarily Hindu Tamils and Muslims) make-up approximately 22% of the total votes. Despite his appeals to an inclusive economic nationalism, they may take a far more sceptical attitude to him.